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THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROCESS IN PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA
R.J. MAy1Papua New Guinea has been undergoing a major process of public sector reform 
since 1999, with substantial donor assistance. 
With the proliferation of new programs, new 
initiatives and restructuring, however, it has 
been difficult, even for senior civil servants, 
to keep up with the changes being introduced, 
and it is sometimes hard for outsiders to judge 
whether a new initiative represents an active 
program or simply a good idea which may be 
forgotten or diverted before its implementation. 
Moreover, with a fairly high level of staff 
turnover, poor documentation processes, and 
weak institutional memories, and donors 
frequently poorly informed about the past 
history of public sector reform, there has been 
some tendency to overlook the potential lessons 
of past failures and successes.
This paper does not attempt a comprehensive 
history of public sector reform in Papua New 
Guinea (on which see Turner and Kavanamur, 
forthcoming) nor a substantive critique of the 
present reform process (on which see Whimp 
2001); its intention, rather, is to provide 
something of a roadmap to the reform process, 
particularly since 1999, in the hopes of better 
informing those participating in it and those 
seeking to understand it.
A brief history of public sector 
reform
Public sector reform in Papua New 
Guinea began within the first four years of 
independence, and has been a more or less 
continuous process ever since.
In May 1979 a Committee on Administrative 
Problems in the Public Service, chaired by 
Bank of Papua New Guinea governor Henry 
ToRobert, was set up by the National Planning 
Committee (NPC) to examine the major 
administrative problems facing Papua New 
Guinea and suggest immediate and longer-term 
measures to resolve them (ToRobert 1979). 
The ToRobert Committee identified a range of 
problems and recommended remedial actions. 
Some of the problems were specific to the early 
post-independence time, but many have been 
recurring issues. They included, for example: 
poor coordination and communication of 
national policies; lack of adequate management 
and performance accountability; poor 
coordination between national and provincial 
programs and inadequate technical support to 
provinces; inadequate funding for provincial 
maintenance; ineffective staff development; 
lack of control over funds; poor payroll system; 
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problems with trust accounts; and inadequate 
training and staff development.
The ToRobert Report contained a long list 
of specific recommendations, including the 
creation of a Programme for Administrative 
Improvement with a number of specified high 
priority projects, a clear policy on manpower 
development, and programs to improve police 
effectiveness. It also raised basic questions 
about the traditional role of the public service 
in development and proposed a high-level 
working group to develop policy proposals on 
the role of the public sector vis à vis the private 
sector. However, in a review of public sector 
reform in Papua New Guinea, Turner and 
Kavanamur (forthcoming) comment that ‘there 
is little record of action and achievement’ in 
the areas of concern identified in the ToRobert 
Report.
Just over three years later, the first of 
a series of World Bank missions visited 
Papua New Guinea to look at public sector 
management in the light of the ToRobert 
recommendations. These visits culminated in 
a report (World Bank 1983) which suggested 
that Papua New Guinea enjoyed ‘basically 
strong public sector management’ with ‘strong 
and carefully controlled budget procedures’, 
‘close expenditure controls’, a sound planning 
process, a Public Services Commission (PSC) 
which had ‘kept itself above politics’, and 
appointments to the public service ‘largely 
free of nepotism or inappropriate political 
influence’. It was, however, critical of Papua 
New Guinea’s ‘highly centralized’ manpower 
development, budgeting and planning systems, 
the lack of mechanisms for the formulation 
and implementation of long-term development 
strategies, and the absence of ‘well-functioning 
administrative mechanisms for the transmission 
of national policy directions from centre to 
periphery’ (ibid.:4-6).
Notwithstanding its positive comments on 
the PSC, the World Bank Report was also critical 
of the strong role of the Commission, suggesting 
that ‘the PSC and the rest of the government 
seem to work at cross-purposes’ (ibid.:34). By 
1983 some of the powers previously exercised 
by the PSC had been transferred to a Department 
of the PSC (subsequently restructured, 
with World Bank assistance, and renamed 
Department of Personnel Management (DPM)), 
and responsibility for management policy and 
the appointment of heads of departments and 
agencies was passed to the NEC. The Public 
Service Management Act, 1986 saw the demise 
of the PSC and the replacement of tenure for 
departmental heads by negotiated employment 
contracts. Predictably, perhaps, and ironically 
given the World Bank’s acknowledgement of 
the PSC’s apolitical role, there followed an 
increasing politicization of the public service.
As part of a World Bank-assisted public 
sector reform, a Program Management 
Unit (PMU) was set up in 1984 to oversee 
a restructuring of the public service, and a 
Resource Management System (RMS) was 
introduced with a view to creating an integrated 
planning system to meet the deficiencies 
identified earlier by the World Bank. The Public 
Finances Management Act was amended in 
1986, giving departmental heads delegated 
financial authority, and performance-based 
accountability systems were developed.
Turner and Kavanamur characterize the 
period from 1985 to 1994 as one of ‘creeping 
crisis in public sector management’. They 
conclude that, ‘It is doubtful whether the PMU’s 
efforts resulted in improved organizational 
outcomes’, and that despite ‘much objective-
writing, timetable-setting and mission-
debating….the RMS did not eventuate as the 
guiding force of the public sector’. Several 
training initiatives, culminating in the World 
Bank-funded National Training Policy launched 
in 1989, ‘fell well short of targets’ (Turner and 
Kavanamur forthcoming). Several attempts 
were made to downsize the public service, with 
little success, and in 1992 a Rationalisation Task 
Force was created ‘to examine ways in which 
the national departments could be restructured 
and their management practices improved’. A 
Policy Coordination and Monitoring Committee 
was established. Following an international 
trend, the World Bank supported a policy of 
corporatization, which commenced in 1991 
(following revelations of corrupt dealings in 
the forestry industry) with the replacement of 
the Department of Forests by a National Forest 
Authority. Notwithstanding these reforms, 
Turner and Kavanamur suggest that by 1995 the 
‘creeping crisis’ had become ‘an acute crisis’: 
‘A steady stream of reports reiterated the need 
for action to address serious problems in almost 
every aspect of public sector management’.
Major developments between 1995 and 1999 
included: the passage of a new Organic Law 
on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments, with provision for a National 
Monitoring Authority to develop minimum 
service standards and monitor performance; 
a series of public sector reforms (including 
improved personnel management and payroll 
controls and some restructuring of departments 
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and agencies) under World Bank structural 
adjustment programs; further efforts at public 
service downsizing, and several institutional 
strengthening projects. In 1999 a World Bank 
review of public sector performance identified 
existing personnel management practices as 
contributing to inefficiency and corruption 
(World Bank 1999:122) and subsequently 
supported the revival of the PSC structure it 
had helped dismantle in 1986.
The later years of the 1990s, however, saw 
a period of deteriorating governance, economic 
decline, and rising tensions in relations 
with the World Bank and other donors. This 
culminated in a vote of no confidence against 
the prime minister, Bill Skate, and in 1999 
Sir Mekere Morauta replaced Skate as prime 
minister. Morauta promptly moved to initiate 
policies designed to achieve reconstruction and 
development (see Igara 2000).
Public sector reform since 1999
The Morauta government set itself six 
objectives: to stabilize the economy; to stabilize 
the budget; to rebuild the institutions of state; 
to remove impediments to investment and 
growth; to reach a peaceful political settlement 
on Bougainville; and to create political stability 
and integrity. A number of fiscal and broader 
economic measures were introduced with 
respect to the first two objectives and a Medium 
Term Plan of Action for Public Sector Reform 
was drawn up for the period 2000-2003; steps 
were taken to safeguard the independence of, 
and to strengthen, the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea (see Kamit 2000), the Ombudsman 
Commission, the auditor general, and the 
public service; an Organic Law on the Integrity 
of Political Parties and Candidates was passed 
and changes made to the electoral system, and 
a long-running peace process culminated in 
the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2003. 
Notwithstanding these reforms, economic and 
political stability proved hard to achieve.
Following the national elections of 2002 
(which were generally conceded to have been 
marked by greater irregularities and violence 
than any previous national election), a new 
coalition government, headed by Sir Michael 
Somare, came into office. The Somare 
government quickly made clear its intention 
to maintain the previous government’s 
commitment to policies of recovery and public 
sector reform. With respect to the former, and in 
the context of a substantial deterioration in the 
fiscal situation, in August 2002 the government 
announced a Program for Recovery and 
Development, which identified as its three main 
objectives, ‘good governance; export-driven 
economic growth; and rural development, 
poverty reduction and empowerment through 
human resource development’.2 
As a framework within which to pursue 
these objectives, the government presented, 
after a lengthy process of consultation, a revised 
Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) 
for 2003-2007, which replaced the previous 
MTDS for 1997-2002.3  The MTDS 2003-2007 
has subsequently been replaced by the MTDS 
2005-2010. With regard to its public sector 
reform agenda, the Somare government also 
presented, in November 2003, a Strategic Plan 
for Supporting Public Sector Reform in Papua 
New Guinea 2003-2007, which superseded the 
Morauta government’s Medium Term Plan of 
Action for Public Sector Reform.
These documents define the broad 
framework for government policies. Within 
this framework, however, there has been a 
proliferation of new systems, programs and 
initiatives addressing particular aspects of the 
reform process. For example, in presenting 
the 2004 budget, the then Minister for Finance 
and Treasury, Bart Philemon, announced that 
the government’s reform agenda would be 
supplemented,
…by a new focus on improving the 
management of public sector employment 
and the control of personnel expenditures; 
restoring the integrity of budget 
institutions and systems to improve 
budgetary discipline; and to review 
the role, functions, and outputs of each 
spending agency in order to identify ways 
of improving the allocative and technical 
efficiencies of public expenditure (Papua 
New Guinea 2003:23).
Several new measures were described by the 
minister, including a Performance Management 
System for Department Heads, a Medium-term 
Budget Framework, an Integrated Financial 
Management System (IFMS), and the creation 
of a Budget Screening Committee (BSC). (Also 
see Kua 2006.)
The following overview attempts to provide 
a rough guide to the public sector reform 
landscape. 
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The MTDS 2005-2010
In a foreword to the MTDS, the Acting 
Minister for National Planning and Monitoring, 
Sir Moi Avei, noted that, ‘Since independence, 
successive governments have prepared many 
worthy development plans and strategies that 
have promised to realize our national vision’, 
but that, while such plans and strategies 
‘were often soundly based, they have not 
been translated into results on the ground’ 
(MTDS 2005-2010: iv). The MTDS 2005-
2010, prepared by the Department of National 
Planning and Rural Development (DNPRD), 
seeks to reverse this trend.
The role of the MTDS is defined:
First to articulate an overarching 
development strategy that will provide 
the guiding framework for prioritizing the 
Government’s expenditure program….
Second, to identify in broad terms, the 
wider policy framework that will help 
strengthen the enabling environment 
for the Program for Recovery and 
Development.
Third, to improve fiscal governance by 
strengthening PNG’s Public Expenditure 
Management (PEM) system (MTDS 
2005-2010:iii, chapter 1).
The key objectives of the government’s 
development policies, its expenditure priorities, 
and the principal elements of a ‘supporting 
policy environment’ are spelled out in the 
MTDS (chapters 2, 3), which also lists ten 
broad ‘guiding principles’ (p.i-ii). Also 
noted are some of the constraints upon, and 
threats to, development; among these, along 
with poor infrastructure, HIV/AIDS, high 
population growth, unplanned urbanization 
and impediments to land utilization, is listed 
‘dysfunctional service delivery systems’ (see 
MTDS 2005-2010:9-10).4
The ability of the government to give 
effect to the MTDS will depend in part upon 
whether the programs identified are affordable 
and sustainable. To this end the MTDS is 
complemented by a Medium Term Resource 
Framework (MTRF), designed ‘to integrate 
the “top-down” resource envelope with the 
“bottom-up” sector programs’ (MTDS 2005-
2010:52). The ‘“top-down” resource envelope’ 
is defined by a Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 
(MTFS) formulated by Treasury for the period 
2003-2007.
The implementation of the MTDS also 
depends on having an effective administrative 
structure, and the MTDS explicitly recognizes 
the importance of good governance and credible 
and stable policies. It devotes some attention 
to the government’s Public Sector Reform 
(PSR) program, which, in broad terms, seeks to 
‘reduce the cost of government, abolish waste 
and non-priority activities, improve service 
delivery and strengthen accountability and other 
systems of good governance’ (MTDS 2005-
2010:v, chapter 5). The PSR program is spelled 
out in fairly general terms in the Strategic Plan 
for Supporting Public Sector Reform in Papua 
New Guinea 2003-2007, and addressed in 
more detail in the Public Expenditure Review 
and Rationalisation (PERR) program (both of 
which are discussed below).
In his foreword to the MTDS, Sir Moi 
Avei commented: ‘…we can no longer ignore 
the dysfunctional system of service delivery 
that has arisen following the 1995 reforms 
to our system of decentralised government’. 
Since a large part of governance, including 
delivery of basic services, is carried out at sub-
national level, the performance of government 
at provincial, district and local level is critical 
for any program of recovery and development 
– though it must be observed that problems 
of service delivery were well in evidence 
before 1995. With regard to decentralization, 
the MTDS states: ‘Improving the relationship 
between the three levels of government will 
be crucial for the effective implementation of 
the new MTDS’, and it notes that a number 
of activities are in place ‘that are designed to 
identify practical solutions to the functioning 
of the decentralized system of government’ 
(MTDS 2005-2010:IV, chapter 4). These are 
discussed below.
A final chapter of the MTDS discusses 
the issues of monitoring and evaluation. 
The MTRF, quarterly budget reviews, and 
the annual budget documents will form part 
of the financial monitoring process, but in 
addition, national departments and agencies, 
provincial and local-level governments, 
NGOs and community-based organizations, 
and other stakeholders ‘will be required to 
participate’ in monitoring and evaluation. 
Specific performance indicators (for both 
the MTDS and the Millenium Development 
Goals [MDGs] (to which Papua New Guinea is 
committed as a signatory to the UN Millenium 
Declaration)5  were to be prepared by the end of 
2005. In a few key sectors (including health and 
education) performance indicators have already 
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been prepared and incorporated into sectoral 
plans. Overall responsibility for monitoring 
and evaluation rests with the DNPRD, which 
will report through the Central Agencies 
Coordinating Committee (see below) to the 
National Executive Council (NEC).
A Strategic Plan for Supporting 
Public Sector Reform in Papua 
New Guinea 200-2007
‘Good governance’ was listed first amongst 
the objectives of the Somare government’s 
Program for Recovery and Development. In an 
address to the National Parliament in August 
2002, the prime minister elaborated the goals 
for good governance:
Strengthening the democratic process;
Political stability at all levels of 
government;
Efficient and effective delivery of 
government services;
A sound regulatory framework; and
Transparency and accountability.
These were to be achieved through an all-
encompassing program of public sector reform 
(MTDS 2005-2010:53-57).
A Strategic Plan for Supporting Public 
Sector Reform in Papua New Guinea 2003-
2007 (hereafter Strategic Plan) was presented 
in November 2003.
In an introductory statement to the Strategic 
Plan, Prime Minister Somare commented that 
on taking office in 2002 his government found 
that progress had been made on many aspects 
of the reform program initiated by the previous 
government, but ‘felt it was essential to reframe 
and to more sharply focus what had, by then, 
proved to be an overly ambitious reform 
agenda’.
The key objectives of public sector reform 
for 2003-2007 were listed as:
A public sector with a clear sense of 
direction
Affordable government
Improving performance, accountability and 
compliance
Improving service delivery.
The strategic plan lists a series of strategies 
and ‘broadly stated’ indicators under each of 
these headings.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The structure for public sector 
reform
With the introduction of the Medium Term 
Plan of Action for Public Sector Reform 2000-
2003, the Morauta government also created a 
new administrative structure to facilitate and 
coordinate the reform process. This structure 
has been broadly maintained by the Somare 
government.
At the apex of this new structure, a Central 
Agencies Coordinating Committee (CACC), 
chaired by the chief secretary to the government 
(currently Joshua Kalinoe), was given overall 
responsibility for designing and managing 
the public sector reform program (Strategic 
Plan:16) The position of the CACC was 
formalized by provisions of the Prime Minister 
and National Executive Council Act, 2002.
A Public Sector Reform Management 
Unit (PSRMU) was also created, ‘to support 
public sector reform by providing professional 
capacity and support to the CACC and 
government organizations’ (ibid.). And an 
independent Public Sector Reform Advisory 
Group (PSRAG), representative of national, 
provincial and local-level administrations, 
the private sector, churches, the public sector 
union, the National Council of Women, and 
research organizations, was established to 
provide stakeholder input.
The Strategic Plan (p.17) outlines the reform 
implementation process in the following terms:
The NEC will provide political leadership 
and direction.
The CACC will provide strategic oversight 
of the public sector reform process.
Departments, agencies and provincial 
administrations are responsible for 
implementing public sector reform, with 
central agency support.
PSRMU is an expert resource available 
to assist central and line agencies and 
provincial administrations.
PSRAG provides input from external 
stakeholders to the public sector reform 
process.
The PSRMU has probably taken a more 
proactive role than simply ‘assisting’ agencies, 
at times putting gentle pressure on them to meet 
their obligations and commitments.
Though not part of this formal structure, a 
Consultative Implementation and Monitoring 
Council (CIMC) provides a private sector input 
•
•
•
•
•
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to the policy making process, in part through 
public national development forums. In 2005 
the CIMC was working with government to 
‘open up the budget process’.
The Public Expenditure Review 
and Rationalisation (PERR) 
program
The PERR is a joint initiative of the Papua 
New Guinea government, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and AusAID, 
initiated in 2002, aimed broadly at improving 
fiscal management. It is described in the MTDS 
2005-2010 (pp.57-58) as ‘a key vehicle for 
generating the savings and cost-efficiencies 
necessary for the successful implementation of 
the MTDS’. A PERR Implementing Committee 
is chaired by Treasury.
In 2003 the PERR produced six discussion 
papers: ‘Road map to fiscal sustainability’, 
Civil service size and payroll’, ‘Restoring the 
integrity of budget institutions and systems’, 
‘Expenditure adjustment and prioritization’, 
‘Improving health spending’, and ‘Improving 
education spending’.
On the subject of fiscal sustainability, the 
authors of the PERR paper suggested in 2003 
that,
The root causes of PNG’s fiscal 
malaise lie in poor governance in 
public finance management. Although 
most of PNG’s budget systems are 
sound, and by some accounts even 
sophisticated, poor governance over the 
years has led to an erosion of budgetary 
discipline, weakening of accountability 
and proliferation of waste, leakage, 
irregularities and malpractices across the 
board….tinkering with budget numbers 
and mandating ad-hoc expenditure cuts, 
as the Government has tried in the past, 
can hardly be expected to be effective in 
such a flawed system.
Several areas were identified for attention in 
the subsequent papers.
With regard to civil service size and payroll, 
it was argued that ‘public sector employment 
in PNG is larger than the country needs or 
can afford’, and that ‘the payroll system is 
flush with waste, leakage and irregularities’. 
A DPM audit suggested that there were some 
2000 unproductive public servants on the 
unattached list (1,200 of them in provincial 
administrations) in 2002, and ‘a large number of 
ghosts on the payroll’. Departments were said 
to recruit and make payments with no regard to 
budget ceilings, and Treasury was accused of 
‘unrealistic appropriations’.
On the topic of restoring the integrity of 
budget institutions and systems, it was argued 
that ‘poor governance over the years has 
allowed [budget systems and processes] to 
be ignored, neglected, misused and abused’ 
while ‘watchdog bodies have been rendered 
ineffective because of absence of follow-up 
action on the irregularities they uncover’, with 
cases ‘delayed, blocked or even abrogated 
because of political pressures and vested 
interests’. There was ‘no sense of collective 
responsibility for the overall budget strategy’. 
Decentralization was said to have ‘led to an 
erosion of budgetary control’.
In relation to expenditure adjustment and 
prioritization, the PERR authors proposed 
an agency-by-agency review of functions 
(apparently going beyond existing Functional 
Expenditure Reviews), expenditure patterns and 
staffing levels, outputs and results, and whether 
certain functions might be privatized. They also 
supported the development of a Medium-term 
Expenditure Framework.
Actions on several of these fronts were 
detailed by the Minister for Finance and Treasury 
in his 2004 budget speech. As part of improved 
management of public sector employment and 
control of personnel expenditure, measures 
had been taken to remove ghost names from 
the payroll, implement a Concept Payroll 
System, reduce the pool of unattached officers 
by reassigning them or scheduling their 
redundancy, reduce the number of casual 
employees, and improve budget estimates and 
expenditure controls. In 2003 the Public Service 
(Management) Act was amended to facilitate 
merit-based appointments at senior levels; this 
is to be complemented by measures to extend 
merit-based appointment procedures to statutory 
authorities, and supported by a system of 
performance-based contracts (the appointment 
of senior public servants has, however, 
remained a point of controversy6). A review of 
government procurement was undertaken in 
2001, and subsequently measures have been 
taken to strengthen the Central Supply and 
Tenders Board (CSTB), reduce discretionary 
powers to create lower-level supply and tenders 
boards, and improve information, reporting and 
disclosure systems (though not all departments 
have subscribed to the new measures). A 
Budget Screening Committee, comprising 
deputy secretaries of the central agencies, was 
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created in 2003 to evaluate spending programs, 
assist prioritization of spending, and establish 
expenditure ceilings in the preparation of the 
2004 budget. The government also announced 
its intention to develop a Medium-term 
Budget Framework within which to consider 
adjustments to public expenditure in the light of 
changes in available funding. And the Financial 
Management Improvement Program (FMIP), 
‘an integrated reform program of financial 
management at all levels of the government’, 
was described as ‘the most significant 
single reform of financial management ever 
undertaken by the Government’ (Papua New 
Guinea 2003:27. Also see FMIP 2003).
Further measures within the context of the 
PERR have addressed budget stability, budget 
processes, expenditure controls (including an 
embargo on out-of-court settlements of claims 
against the state7), payroll processes, salary 
administration, appointments procedures, 
expenditure prioritization and adjustment, non-
tax revenue, oversight of statutory corporations, 
and inter-government relations.8
‘Rightsizing’
Reduction in the size of the public sector has 
been a recurring theme in reviews of the public 
sector, particularly reviews by the World Bank, 
in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. In 1990 
(coinciding with Papua New Guinea’s first 
application for a structural adjustment loan) 
the World Bank called for a downsizing of the 
public sector, while at the same time noting 
the need for improved health and education 
services (World Bank 2000; also see Curtin 
2000). Retrenchment exercises were carried 
out in 1990, 1994 and 1996, but were generally 
judged to have had little effect, with retrenched 
public servants either remaining on unattached 
lists, being reemployed, and/or being replaced 
by new recruits. In 1999 the Skate government 
announced plans to reduce the public service 
from 60,000 to 52,500, with costs to be met 
from privatization of public enterprises. But 
the proposal was not based on any review 
of functional requirements and substantially 
underestimated the costs of the retrenchment, 
with the result that many ‘retrenched’ personnel 
remained on the payroll. When the Morauta 
government came to office, the retrenchment 
program was suspended, pending further study.9 
As noted, the issue was raised again in the 
PERR, and is referred to in the MTDS 2005-
2010 (p.54) as a core objective of public sector 
reform.
In 2005, an independent committee, 
headed by Mike Manning, then director of 
the Institute of National Affairs, was asked to 
undertake a study and make recommendations 
on public sector rightsizing, in the context of 
a government policy of reducing the public 
sector by 10 per cent, primarily in ‘non-key 
service areas’ (though it does not seem to 
be clear whether the 10 per cent referred to 
wage and salary costs or workforce numbers). 
The committee reported in September 2005. 
It recommended the abolition or merger of 
several government departments and agencies 
(including DPM, DNPRD, DPLGA and the 
National Research Institute), reduction in the 
number of ministries and ministerial advisers, 
closure of several overseas missions, and 
the outsourcing of some services to public 
providers (Public Sector Rightsizing Working 
Group 2005. Also see Post-Courier 23, 24, 28 
February 2006), but Manning was reported 
as saying that the committee was unable to 
achieve the desired reduction of 10 per cent and 
maintain the essential services of government 
(Post-Courier 24 February 2006). By end 2006 
few of the committee’s recommendations had 
been implemented.
Separately, retrenchment within the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), as part 
of a recommended Force restructuring, seeks to 
reduce troop numbers from around 4,200 to less 
than 2,000.10 But despite external funding for 
the retrenchment, poor handling of the exercise 
resulted in early 2001 in a near mutiny, during 
which soldiers broke into the PNGDF armory. 
The Morauta government agreed to rescind a 
cabinet decision on Force size reduction, though 
in fact numbers continue to decline, primarily 
through a Voluntary Release Scheme.
The Public Sector Workforce 
Development Initiative (PSWDI).
The PSWDI was created in 2004 with 
the aim of providing a ‘comprehensive 
framework…which guides all activities related 
to public sector workforce development’, with 
emphasis on workforce development rather than 
‘traditional training’, local ownership, use of 
existing linkages and networks, and incentives to 
improved performance. It envisages two phases 
– 2005-2007 focusing on the public service, 
and 2008-2010 to include the wider public 
sector – each with a framework and annual 
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implementation plans. The PSWDI is described 
as a ‘cross-agency partnership across the three 
tiers of government’. It is led by a ‘think tank’ 
comprising senior executives of key national 
institutions, chaired by the deputy secretary 
of the Department of Personnel Management 
(DPM). Initially it has identified eight ‘action 
areas’: engaging all stakeholders, strengthening 
lead institutions (listing DPM, CACC, DPLGA, 
PNG Institute of Public Administration 
[PNGIPA], and National Training Council 
[NTC]), executive development, providing the 
‘new basics’, developing the ‘next generation’, 
aligning supply with demand, building and 
sharing knowledge, and coordination and 
management.11
Corporatization/privatization
Like ‘rightsizing’, corporatization/
privatization has been a prominent item on the 
‘New Public Management’ agenda espoused 
by the World Bank and other donors since 
the late 1970s.12 From the 1990s privatization 
of government enterprises was also seen 
increasingly as a (one-off) source of government 
revenue. 
On coming to office in 1999, the Morauta 
government, assisted by a loan from the World 
Bank, which was pushing to have major public 
enterprises ‘brought to the point of sale’, 
established an Independent Public Business 
Corporation (IPBC) to pursue a privatization 
policy. Strong popular opposition to the policy 
led to protest marches in 2001 and 2002, in 
which disgruntled members of the PNGDF 
supported student leaders and during which 
four students were shot dead by police. 
Notwithstanding this, the government divested 
itself of its 50.1 per cent equity in Orogen 
Minerals Ltd (a public company, floated in 
1996, which took over a substantial part of the 
government’s equity in mining and petroleum 
companies operating in Papua New Guinea) 
and sold a 75 per cent interest in the Papua 
New Guinea Banking Corporation to the local 
subsidiary of the Australian-based ANZ Bank. 
The latter transaction yielded K153 million to 
Consolidated Revenue. Telikom PNG and PNG 
ElCom (the Papua New Guinea Electricity 
Commission [now PNG Power]) were also put 
on the market.
Following the national election of 2002, the 
Somare government suspended the privatization 
process, calling off a nearly-completed 
sale of Telikom PNG to Fiji’s privatized 
telecommunications corporation and refusing an 
offer from a Zimbabwean company. According 
to the MTDS 2005-2010, privatization will be 
maintained under the PSR program, but ‘on the 
basis of a public-private partnership approach’ 
in which ‘the long-term interests of the Papua 
New Guinean community will take priority 
over the short-term financing requirements of 
the National Budget’. The IPBC remains, but 
as a ‘long-term asset manager’ with the task of 
seeing that state-owned assets are rehabilitated 
and service levels improved. 
  Decentralization
A system of decentralization, based on 
provincial governments, was recommended by 
the pre-independence Constitutional Planning 
Committee, dropped from the constitution by 
the Constituent Assembly, and subsequently 
revived (in part as a response to the unilateral 
declaration of independence by Bougainville in 
1975) through the Organic Law on Provincial 
Government in 1977. By the early 1990s all but 
five of the nineteen provincial governments had 
been suspended at least once – mostly on the 
ground of financial mismanagement (though 
as Sir Peter Barter (2004:136) has noted, 
‘Undoubtedly, too, suspension of provincial 
governments was sometimes politically 
motivated’).
In 1993-94 a Village Services Programme 
was introduced with the objective of empowering 
some 240 community governments through 
a structure of district centres and community 
councils linking the national government with 
village groups, largely bypassing provincial 
governments. Also in 1993 a Bi-partisan 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Provincial 
Government recommended a comprehensive 
restructuring of the provincial government 
system. Draft legislation was tabled in the 
National Parliament early the following year.
In June 1995, in the face of strong opposition 
from some provincial governments and senior 
politicians, the new Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments and Local-Level Governments 
(OLPGLLG) was finally passed. In explaining 
the general thrust of the proposed new organic 
law in 1994, the Constitutional Review 
Commission described it as one ‘of greater 
decentralisation…in that more powers are 
decentralised further to local level governments’ 
(quoted from a CRC brief published in Times of 
PNG 7 April 1994, pp.31-42). Others, however, 
saw it as a re-centralization, in that it did away 
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with elected provincial members and enhanced 
the role of national MPs.
As reflected in comments of the MTDS and 
Strategic Plan, however, there is a widespread 
feeling that the 1995 reforms have not solved 
the problems of the decentralized system. In the 
words of the MTDS (pp.9-10):
…in the years since the passage of the 
Organic Law [1995], service delivery 
has deteriorated. On the whole service 
delivery systems are dysfunctional and 
there remains widespread confusion over 
functional (who does what) and financial 
(who pays for what) responsibilities 
across the three levels of government. 
As well, institutional capacity to deliver 
services is best described as grossly 
inadequate.
Several problems have been identified:
To give effect to the new decentralization 
arrangements, a range of new legislation 
and amendments to existing legislation was 
required; much of this has not been done.
The division of government responsibilities 
between three levels of government has made 
for a very complex form of decentralization, 
in which functional responsibilities are not 
always clearly understood, contributing to 
poor service delivery.
In the context of deteriorating economic 
and fiscal circumstances, the financial 
provisions of the 1995 Organic Law 
have proved unworkable, resulting in the 
underfunding of provincial governments 
(that is, provincial governments have 
received less than mandated by the funding 
formulae of the OLPGLLG), and consequent 
legal challenges. An additional problem 
is that provisions for some ‘equalization’, 
or redistribution of funds from the richer 
provinces to the poorer, provided for in both 
the 1977 and the 1995 arrangements, have 
never been put into effect.
Underfunding, poor capacity and 
deteriorating infrastructure, mismanagement 
and corruption, lawlessness, and the 
politicization of provincial, district and 
local-level administration, have contributed 
to poor service delivery in many parts of 
the country, especially the more remote 
areas. In the extreme case, in parts of the 
Southern Highlands Province there has been 
a collapse of governance at district and local 
level.
•
•
•
•
During the 1990s and early 2000s there 
also appears to have been a decline in 
the capacity of the DPLGA to support 
provincial and local-level governments and 
carry forward the changes introduced by the 
OLPGLLG.
Within the context of the Public Sector 
Reform program several initiatives have been 
taken in the area of decentralization.
National Economic and Fiscal Commission 
(NEFC) initiatives
Provision for a NEFC was included in 
the OLPGLLG, though the NEFC was not 
set up until 1998.13 Since then it has played 
an active role in identifying problems in 
intergovernmental relations and formulating 
proposals to address them, specifically through 
a Review of Inter Governmental Financial 
Relations (RIGFA) requested by the national 
government.
The NEFC has been focusing on three 
projects: (i) a Responsibility Specification 
Exercise (RSE), designed to produce a detailed 
‘specification matrix’ which identifies, for 
the three levels of government, who decides, 
who actions and who pays (Simonelli 2003) 
(by early 2005 detailed matrices had been 
prepared for eight sectors – health, education, 
agriculture, community justice, forestry, 
fisheries, infrastructure, and lands and physical 
planning – for consultation with provincial 
government representatives); (ii) an exercise to 
measure the relative costs of providing services 
at district level (which demonstrated that the 
costs of service delivery in the higher-cost 
provinces, districts and local-level government 
areas were several times those of delivering 
the same services in the lower-cost provinces, 
districts and local-level government areas); (iii) 
an exercise to measure the relative revenue-
raising capacities of provinces (most of the 
resource-rich provinces, such as New Ireland, 
have a relatively high revenue per capita, even 
though their costs of service provision may 
be relative low). By taking revenue-raising 
capacities and relative costs of providing 
services, the NEFC has been able to identify 
the ‘fiscal gaps’ at provincial level, and on this 
basis has recommended new inter-governmental 
financial arrangements designed to achieve 
some degree of ‘equalization’ amongst 
provinces (see NEFC 2005). A Less Developed 
Districts Grant Program (for districts identified 
by the NEFC and DNPRD) was introduced as 
part of a package of interim proposals for new 
intergovernmental financial arrangements in 
•
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2003.14 In late 2006 the necessary amendments 
to the OLPGLLG had passed the first reading 
stage in the National Parliament. The issue of 
fiscal inequality is a familiar one in virtually all 
federal and federal-type systems of government, 
most of which have mechanisms for fiscal 
redistribution broadly of the type proposed by 
the NEFC. Both the 1977 OLPG and the 1995 
OLPGLLG contained such provisions, but they 
were never put into effect.
Strengthening of DPLGA
DPLGA provides the key link between sub-
national governments (provinces and local-
level governments) on the one hand and the 
national government (specifically NEC, CACC 
and NMA) on the other. For some time after 
1995, however, there was a general feeling that 
the Department was not fulfilling this role very 
effectively. An internal review of DPLGA was 
undertaken in 2003, leading to departmental 
restructuring and the preparation of a corporate 
plan. In an introduction to DPLGA’s Strategic 
and Corporate Plan June 2004-December 
2007, recently appointed secretary, Gei Ilagi, 
speaks of ‘the resolve of DLGA to re-invent 
itself into an efficient and effective public sector 
organisation’. The Corporate Plan identifies 
four ‘strategic result areas’:
provide policy and legislative support to 
provincial and local governments;
coordinate, monitor and report on the 
governance performance of Provincial and 
Local Governments;
help build the capacity of Provincial and 
Local Governments; and 
undertake special projects related to 
Provinces and Local-level Governments as 
required by the National Government.
Performance indicators and completion 
dates are listed for each area.
AusAID is assisting in the implementation 
of the corporate plan, capacity building for 
provincial and district management teams, 
remobilization of the National Monitoring 
Authority (see below), and policy and legal 
advisory roles to provinces and the minister.
Revival of the National Monitoring Authority 
(NMA)
The NMA (formally titled the Provincial 
and Local-level Service Monitoring Authority 
[PLLSMA]15) was established under the 
OLPGLLG with a range of functions, 
including:
•
•
•
•
(a) coordination and monitoring of the 
implementation of national policies at 
the provincial and local level;
(b) establishment and monitoring of 
minimum development standards for 
rural and urban communities;
(e) assessment of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of sub-national governments, 
and
(h) ensuring that all appointments to 
offices at sub-national level are based on 
merit.
To carry out these functions, the OLPGLLG 
requires that it establish an inspectorate in each 
province. Enabling legislation for the NMA/
PLLSMA was to be drafted in 2005; meanwhile, 
operating guidelines prepared.16
The NMA/PLLSMA comprises the heads of 
the major sectoral departments and the NEFC as 
permanent members (chaired by the secretary, 
DPLGA), but may also call on other agencies 
or public enterprises. It is required to meet 
four times per year, one of those meetings to 
coincide with the annual meeting of provincial 
administrators. DPLGA provides the NMA/
PLLSMA secretariat and has administrative 
responsibility for the proposed inspectorates.
Several meetings of the NMA were held in 
the latter part of the 1990s, with little concrete 
output, but it did not meet from 2001 to 2004. 
Neither were the mandated inspectorates 
established. In 2001 the government announced 
a Performance Management Process (PMP), 
to be introduced into all provinces between 
November 2001 and December 2002, designed 
to improve service delivery to communities. 
A pro forma Annual Provincial Performance 
Report was prepared on behalf of the NMA, 
with a range of questions under six headings 
– Governance, Organization Development, 
Education, Transport/Works, Agriculture and 
Livestock, and Health – and a Handbook for 
Completing the Annual Provincial Report was 
distributed amongst provincial advisers.17 
As part of the recent public sector reform 
program, and particularly its recognition of 
the importance of sub-national governance and 
service delivery, the NMA was re-activated in 
August 2004 (see Barter 2004:133-135) and 
has held several meetings in 2005 and 2006. 
Provincial inspectorates are to be established 
progressively, initially with one in each of 
the four regions. The NMA/PLLSMA, in 
consultation with the national sectoral agencies, 
has been developing minimum service delivery 
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standards, a monitoring and performance 
assessment system, and a provincial 
performance system (it is proposed that a select 
number of provinces be assessed each year, 
with all provinces being assessed every three 
to four years); this has been a long drawn-out 
process.
The Provincial Performance Improvement 
Initiative (PPII)
The PEII was launched in late 2004 as 
joint undertaking of the DPLGA, the DNPRD 
and the Australian government. Its purpose is 
‘to improve provincial public administration 
including accountability and the integrity of 
budget systems, so that provinces are better 
able to fulfill their service delivery mandates’. 
Initially it has operated in three provinces – East 
New Britain, Eastern Highlands and Central, 
selected in part on the basis of their political 
and administrative leadership commitment and 
track record of good management (that is to 
say, the relatively ‘easy’ provinces). AusAID, 
under its Sub-National Initiative (SNI)18 and 
with funding from the PNG Incentive Fund 
(PNGIF), has provided five budget/expenditure 
advisers co-located in the three provinces, as 
well as input from a strategic planning adviser. 
The three provinces’ 2005 budgets and related 
improvement plans – which ‘articulated 
current and future provincial reforms including 
retrenchment, asset management and internal 
revenue collection as well as identifying priority 
development areas such as key roads and rural 
poverty alleviation strategies’ – were submitted 
to the PPII steering committee in December 
2004, and AusAID allocated K1 million to 
each of the provinces for planned activities. 
An AusAID officer is also co-located within 
DPLGA to coordinate support for the PPII and 
link the PPII provinces to ongoing national 
initiatives and donor programs.
Provincial management teams (PMTs) and 
district management teams (DMTs)
PMTs and DMTs were established in the 
1980s as part of the provincial government 
system which existed prior to 1995, with a 
view to achieving improved coordination of 
provincial and local-level government activities. 
They are not mandated by the OLPGLLG, 
but are being revived in most provinces, with 
support from DPLGA under its Capacity 
Building Initiative. PMTs normally comprise 
the provincial administrator (who chairs the 
team), the provincial treasurer, provincial 
section heads/advisers, district administrators 
and treasurers, and representatives of national 
functions in the province as required. There 
has, however, been some confusion about the 
relationship between PMTs and JPPBPCs, 
and some provincial administrators have 
complained that the PMTs usurp the position of 
the provincial administrators).
 National Development Charter
The National Development Charter was 
negotiated in 2000-2001 as a mechanism for 
delivering priority services at sub-national 
level, primarily through matched national and 
donor funding and district funds allocated 
through the Rural Action Program/district 
support grants. The National Development 
Charter appears to have lapsed around 2002 
(Barter [2004:145] says that in 2004 DPLGA 
could not find a copy of it), but was restored 
in 2004, with proposals for a Planning 
Systems Support Program (to support the 
implementation of a uniform planning system 
across all levels of government), a Provincial 
Services Cadetship Program (to support tertiary 
students interested in a career in provincial and 
district administration), and provincial medium 
term development strategies. 
A new initiative under the National 
Development Charter in 2005 was the District 
Roads Improvement Program (DRIP), though 
which provincial governments and JDPBPCs 
will allocate funds for specified road projects 
and receive matching national government 
and donor funding. It is proposed to introduce 
similar improvement programs for primary 
health care (DHIP) and basic education (DEIP) 
(MTDS 2005-2010:49-51).
(District) Services Improvement Program 
(SIP/DSIP)
A Service Improvement Program (SIP), 
funded under an Asian Development Bank 
structural adjustment loan, was designed 
to strengthen capacity building for service 
delivery at provincial and district levels, but 
apparently funds were withdrawn in 2005 
(Kua 2006). Subsequently a District Services 
Improvement Program (DSIP), was announced 
in the 2004 budget, together with a supporting 
Capacity Building Program (CPB) for 
local-level governments. Initially described 
as ‘aimed at re-engineering cumbersome 
government processes’, the DSIP appears to 
have become a mechanism for fast-tracking 
district infrastructure projects. The DSIP was 
operating in six provinces in mid 2005, with 
more to follow.
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Another initiative at district level has 
been the District Treasury roll-out, which 
aims to bring not only Treasury facilities but 
also banking and postal services to district 
headquarters. The roll-out program was always 
an ambitious initiative. It involves the provision 
of office and infrastructure for existing staff, 
power generators for staff accommodation and 
computer facilities in district headquarters. 
A chronic shortage of fuel usually leads to 
security problems. According to a Department 
of Finance presentation to the Governors’ 
Conference in 2004, 38 (of a planned 83) 
district treasuries were ‘fully functional’, but 
some of these appear to have closed and further 
progress has been affected by an enquiry into 
allegations of corruption within the Treasury 
Department.
Provincial Economic Impact Program 
(PEIP)
The PEIP was announced in the 2005 
development budget, as a program to 
‘identify areas, in each province, in which the 
Government can help to facilitate increased 
economic activity’. K10 million was allocated 
to PEIP in 2005. 
Overview
The post 1999 reforms have given rise to a 
plethora of ‘programs’ and ‘initiatives’, mostly 
designed to achieve what one might expect 
to be part of the normal day-to-day activities 
of departments, agencies and sub-national 
governments (but which clearly have not been). 
Inevitably perhaps, much of what is listed in the 
goals and guiding principles of these programs 
and initiatives consists of broad, uncontroversial 
statements of intention; nevertheless experience 
suggests that it is sometimes useful to spell 
out what might seem obvious, especially if in 
spelling out objectives and strategies one can 
provide a framework within which specific 
problems may be identified, addressed and 
monitored. As several people, including Prime 
Minister Somare, have observed, what has been 
lacking in public sector reform in Papua New 
Guinea in the past has been not so much sound 
policies as a commitment to implement them at 
all levels of government.
In the proliferation of new initiatives, 
some of them largely donor-driven, there is 
a danger that overall coordination becomes 
more difficult. It is clear that many public 
servants (and advisers), including some senior 
officers, have an incomplete knowledge of 
the range of new activities being introduced 
(Sir Peter Barter’s comments on the National 
Development Charter have been quoted 
above). This is exacerbated by the facts that 
key documents are often almost impossible to 
obtain,19 that increasing demands on the time 
of senior officers means that they frequently 
delegate or miss attendance at joint committee 
meetings, and that rapid turnover of staff (not 
to mention the retrenchment of a generation 
of middle managers with extensive field 
experience) shortens collective departmental 
memories. It is also clear that there is a 
significant knowledge gap between Waigani 
and the provincial capitals, district headquarters, 
and local-level government wards.
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Melanesia, RSPAS.
Endnotes.
1 I am indebted to Kathy Whimp for her comments 
on a draft of this paper.
2 In the 2004 Budget Speech, these are restated as 
‘(a) promotion of good governance;  (b) improv-
ing economic management;  (c) improving public 
sector performance; and (d) removing barriers to 
investment and economic growth’ (Papua New 
Guinea 2003:23).
3 Referring back to the MTDS 1997-2002, the 
MTDS 2005-2010 (pp.5-6) says, ‘Although the 
policies and priorities contained in the MTDS 
1997-2002 were soundly based, they were not 
rigorously applied or followed in practice’, partly 
because there was ‘very little ownership of the 
MTDS, across all levels of government’. Specifi-
cally, the earlier MTDS ‘was poorly integrated 
with the policies and programs of the provincial 
and local level governments’.
4 For a review of the MTDS 2005-2010, and a 
summary of its predecessors, see Mawuli et al. 
(2005).
5 The eight MDGs, to be achieved by 2015, broadly, 
are:  eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
achieve universal primary education for all chil-
dren; promote gender equality and empower 
women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal 
health; combat HIV/AIDS, TB and other diseases; 
ensure environmental sustainability; and develop 
a global partnership for development. Papua New 
Guinea is currently behind schedule in achieving 
 The Public Sector Reform Process in Papua New Guinea
1
the targets (see Millenium Development Goals: 
Progress Report for Papua New Guinea 2004, 
and National 26 September 2005).
6 See, for example Michael Unage in National 
18 August 2005, and Prime Minister Somare’s 
earlier statement to parliament, printed in Post-
Courier 12 July 2005. Also see the comments of 
Chief Secretary Joshua Kalinoe, who accused pol-
iticians of bypassing formal procedures required 
under the Public Service Management Act to 
remove departmental heads who had not ‘cooper-
ated’ with them (Post-Courier 30 January 2007, 
National 30 January 2007).
7 In August 2005 it was reported that success-
ful compensation claims against the state over 
the past ten years (mostly arising from police 
actions) had amounted to K500 million (National 
16 August 2005); the following month it was fur-
ther reported that the National Court had ordered 
the state to pay K266,000 to a victim of a police 
shooting in 1995 (National 21 September 2005).
8 Chief Secretary, Joshua Kalinoe, presentation to 
National Research Institute, 24 September 2005.
9 Notwithstanding this, in an article in Papua 
New Guinea Yearbook 2002, Morauta stated that 
retrenchment had cut K27.6 from the public ser-
vice wage bill and that in the National Fisheries 
Agency and the Government Printer alone staff 
had been reduced by 235 Morauta 2002:8-9).
10 Numbers vary: at the end of 1998 Force size was 
4,600; in 2000 there was talk of reducing numbers 
from 4,200 to around 3,000 at end 2000 and 1,500 
by mid 2001; in January 2001 a Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons Group recommended a cut from 
what was then 4,150 to 1,900 within six months; 
in June 2001 Force size was quoted as 3,340 and 
the aim was to reduce this to 2,000 over three 
years. At end 2006 Force size was around 2,300.
11 See PSWDI, Framework 2005-2007, 1 March 
2005.
12 For an account of corporatization/privatization 
policy in Papua New Guinea, see Curtin (forth-
coming). Also see Whimp (2001).
13 The OLPG of 1977 provided for a National Fiscal 
Commission, which was active in the early years 
of decentralization but was allowed to lapse after 
disagreements with the national government.
14 Funds (amounting to K3.3 million in 2005) allo-
cated for less developed district grants were in 
fact diverted elsewhere (mostly for expenditures 
in the Southern Highlands).
15 Since the latter part of 2006 the NMA has reverted 
to its formal title (PLLSMA).
16 See Department of Provincial and Local Gov-
ernment Affairs, Operating Guidelines for the 
National Monitoring Authority (NMA), Port 
Moresby, n.d. (2004).
17 The record shows, however, that only 9 provinces 
submitted annual management reports in 2001, 2 
in 2002, 8 in 2003 and 7 in 2004.
18 The SNI is an AusAID program focused specifi-
cally on governance at the sub-national level, with 
a view to improving service delivery at provincial, 
district and local-level government. It has three 
components:  (1) support for national agencies 
(DPLGA, NEFC, and NMA) in coordinating and 
facilitating sub-national government performance; 
(2) support for provincial and local-level govern-
ments ‘in improving their public administration 
and strengthening their planning, budgeting, 
implementing and monitoring cycle’ (principally 
through the PPII and support for PMTs and the 
PMP), with provision to engage flexibly with 
Special Case Provinces – ‘provinces of strategic 
and national interest to both Papua New Guinea 
and Australia’ (currently Bougainville, Western 
Province and Southern Highlands); ‘In provinces 
where governance reforms are lagging, alternate 
partnerships with non-state institutions, such as 
resource companies, will be explored to ensure 
delivery of some basic services to disadvantaged 
rural populations are maintained’; (3) better align-
ment of Australia’s assistance program with Papua 
New Guinea’s decentralized system, including 
support for ‘reform opportunities’. In 2006 the 
SNI was expanded, as the Sub-national Strategy.
19 Donors are not always innocent on this account: 
for example, an expenditure tracking exercise for 
education, undertaken by the National Research 
Institute for the World Bank in 2003 as part of a 
Public Expenditure and Service Delivery study, 
and involving an extensive collection of data, has 
never been released. The data is now more than 
five years old.
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